Introduction
Islamic finance has grown strong particularly during the last 50 years in various parts of the world including Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sudan etc and in some non Muslim countries (like China, UK). However, little attention has been paid to the framework in which the monetary policy maker and conductor (i.e., the central bank) performs its functions. Resultantly, despite tremendous growth in Islamic financial services, Islamic financial institutions are faced with issues that prove hurdles in their functioning to their own satisfaction and to the satisfaction of their customers. One such hurdle is the non-availability of acceptable benchmark price for Islamic financial instruments. It is currently linked to the price of conventional instruments (like KIBOR in the case of Pakistan). This paper reviews available literature on central banking in Islamic financial environment and the practice followed by central banks for liquidity management and monetary management in countries where Islamic banking is prevalent. With the help of easily available data and based on a simple statistical test, the paper proposes a benchmark for pricing domestic financial transactions as well as international bilateral/multilateral and institutional arrangements like with IMF and World Bank. It also suggests a monetary policy regime for central banks compliant with Islamic principles.
Literature Review
In literature, relevant to the role and functions of central bank and monetary management based on Islamic ideas, we find concepts such as refinance ratio (Siddique, 1982) , qard-e-hasnah ratio (Khan, 1982) , Mudarabah based lending between commercial and central banks and restricting high powered money by way of required reserve ratio than relying on OMO (Chapra, 1983) , composite stock (Zangeneh & Salam, 1993) and central bank having equity stake in commercial banks (Uzair, 1982) to name a few. None has challenged the monetary policy regime within which central banks operate to purify the central bank from use of interest rate. As a result, central banks in Muslim countries are following interest related monetary policy regimes and Islamic commercial banks have been facing problem pertaining to benchmark price; like price of Islamic financial instruments in Pakistan are linked to KIBOR (Karachi Interbank Offered Rate) which is basically a pricing benchmark for conventional banking. Kurrihara (1951) asserts that if a central bank is the government's bank, then, if government sells securities to the central bank, interest paid by the government will eventually come back to the government without economic or payoff difference. A number of Shariah scholars hold this view. But to some scholars interest is prohibited in absolute sense and it cannot be accommodated even if the same transaction is reversed over a period of time and thereby nullifying the economic impact. Furthermore, during the financial repression, governments around the world had been manipulating remuneration in favor of fiscal authorities while selling securities to central banks. And that had always been easy for governments because they had not to record (with central banks) economic activities for such transactions. Chapra (1983) realizing that the two important instruments of monetary policy in the capitalist economy, discount rate and OMO in interest-bearing government securities will not be available, recommended following measures: (i) central bank should make the reserve money, created by it, available partly to the government and partly to the commercial banks and the specialized financial institutions; (ii) a proportion of commercial banks' demand deposits (say 25 percent) should be diverted to the government to enable it to finance socially beneficial projects in which profit-sharing is not feasible and the government would pay service charges to the commercial banks for their deposit mobilization services; (iii) commercial banks should be required to hold a certain proportion (say 10-20 percent) of their time and demand liabilities with the central bank as statutory reserves and the central bank should pay the commercial banks the cost of mobilizing these deposits just as the government would pay the cost of mobilizing demand deposits diverted to the government. Siddiqui (1982) supported the use of "refinance ratio", i.e., central bank refinancing a part of the interest-free loans provided by commercial banks to influence the volume of short term credit extended by commercial banks. Khan (1982) advocated the use of qard-e-hasnah ratio, i.e., the percentage of demand deposits that commercial banks are obliged to lend as an interest free loan to influence the availability of credit. Uzair (1982) proposed that a central bank can acquire equity stake in commercial banking by holding 25 percent of the capital stocks of the commercial banks to get a permanent source of income and play its role as a lender of last resort. However, his proposal can cause conflict of interest between regulator and private banking institutions.
Along with other suggestions Zangeneh and Ahmad (1993) presented an alternative to money management. They recommended that the central bank could charge the borrowing bank a weighted average rate of return in different sectors of the economy. This will create problems with reference to choice of sectors to calculate the weighted average rate of return. A particular bank may not have any investment in certain sector(s). Furthermore, this suggestion does not solve all the problems pertaining to pricing of products in Islamic finance. Reddy (2001) highlighted an important problem in an Islamic economy as to how it will deal with external debt management which is primarily interest based. Khan (2004) argued against elimination of interest by a legal decree and favored free market forces to bring the interest rates down to zero 4 . He emphasized on providing incentives for the use of equity over debt financing. He proposed following policy measures: i) reducing reserve requirements to increase supply of loanable funds; ii) enforcing unlimited liability; iii) gradual decline in interest to make investments in debt based instruments less lucrative and shift loanable funds towards equity based instruments; iv) allowing dividend as a tax deductible expense; and v) providing fiscal incentives to non-leveraged firms and disincentives to leveraged firms.
Existing Practices in Muslim Countries
In almost all the Muslim countries a combination of various policy instruments is used for monetary policy purpose including; a) Minimum Reserve Requirement; b) Open Market Operations, and c) Discount Rate. For example, the monetary policy of Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA) relies primarily on variations in the reserve ratio requirements. A significant secondary tool is selective credit controls which include regulation of credit ceilings, cash margins, terms and conditions of customer transactions, limits, prohibitions on specific categories of loans, and fixing the assets to be held within the Kingdom by each bank. SAMA also uses its own accounts and government deposits with commercial banks to regulate the money supply. But again SAMA uses ORR (Official Repo Rate) for short term liquidity management.
In some countries there are some special arrangements for Islamic financial transactions. Such countries include Sudan and Malaysia. Central bank of Sudan provides financial support to the Islamic banks facing liquidity problems through purchasing financial papers "Sukuks" from them. In Malaysia various types of instruments are in use including Bank Negara Monetary Notes-i (BNMN-i). Malaysia has sophisticated array of Islamic finance products. However, the prevalent use of Bai-al-Dayn (Sale of Debt) and Bai-Inaah (Buy Back) is not recommended by many Islamic scholars and hence it warrants us to look for better alternatives compliant with Islamic principles.
Operational side of monetary management is relatively better developed in countries like Pakistan and Malaysia. In Pakistan two interbank trading agreements -the Interbank Musharakah and Interbank Wakalah -are being used as standard contracts in the Islamic finance industry. The Islamic interbank market is in the process to replace the KIBOR, with the Islamic Interbank Offered Rate (IIBOR), and offer an avenue for Islamic banks to lend excess funds to each other 5 . Interbank Musharakah is a short term restricted partnership where the banks are invited to invest amount in a special pool of assets on a pre-agreed profit sharing ratio agreed upon at the outset. Interbank Wakalah is an investment management contract whereby the investor agrees to provide the Islamic bank with funds to invest in different assets. The Islamic bank acts as the investor's agent and is paid a service based fee. In Malaysia, the Islamic Inter bank Money Market (IIMM) was introduced in 1990s as a short-term intermediary to provide a ready source of short-term investment outlets based on Shariah principles. Through the IIMM, the Islamic banks and banks participating in the Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS) match the funding requirements effectively and efficiently. 5 It is feared that conceptually it will not be much different from KIBOR. 
Benchmark Price for the Islamic Financial Instruments
Solution to the benchmarking the price of Islamic financial instruments rests in the presence of real economic activity in the base of any proposal and its feasibility for business performance in the presence of conventional banking. To find such a solution the paper marries two ideas: one found in Islamic economics literature where Usmani (2003) We find only 125 such countries for which consistent data series were available for both the variables. Based upon the standard deviation of the nominal income growth series (for each country) we dropped the top 20 percent highly volatile countries and plotted in figure 2 the average official interest rate and nominal GDP growth rate of remaining 100 countries (for list see Table 2 of Appendix) for . The behaviour of the two variables for a larger set of countries is not different from those of advanced economies shown in figure 1.
In addition to the above visual analysis the study has also tested if the means of these two series are statistically equal. 11 . Furthermore, it gives incentive to lender to oversee the use of lent money to ensure proposed use of money in effective manner to raise the returns to economy and to itself. statistically same. This strengthens our suggestion that Nominal GDP growth rate can be used as benchmark for pricing of Islamic financial instruments as the data on nominal income growth rate and official policy rate are statistically found to be generated from the distributions with same mean and variance. 9 Slope of the yield curve itself is based upon expected future economic performance. So it is better to link price of the financial instruments directly to the future expected nominal income growth rate. 10 Real GDP growth rates turn negative during recession but this is rare for nominal GDP growth rate. But still one can ask what to do when nominal GDP growth is going to be negative. The suggestion is to benchmark the pricing of Islamic financial instruments to zero for assets side. On the liabilities side Islamic financial institutions can ask for service charges from the deposit holder as has been suggested in the literature while discussing deflation management in late 1990s in Japan. 11 Though issues pertaining to nominal income targeting as monetary policy regime in Islamic countries can be addressed in a different research study which is out of scope of this paper but nominal income targeting will also be useful in balancing the role of central bank as conservative one and as pro-growth.
Another question can be, is it similar to indexation to inflation? The answer is no. Inflation is subjective measure compared to income growth rates. Our proposal includes real income factor in addition to the inflation (compensation).
An important aspect of proposal in this study is that it can be used in solving issues in external debt management of countries ready to operate their economies on Islamic economics principles even if the lending/borrowing country/institution is operating under capitalistic structure. Take example of International Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF provides lending to member countries for dealing with balance of payments crisis and to maintain stability in the economy in the form of Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), Flexible Credit Line (FCL), Emergency Assistance (EA), Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), etc. If these loans are in IMF's reserve currency, i.e., SDR which is composed of a basket of currencies namely USD, JPY, GBP and Euro; the financing facility so provided can be benchmarked using nominal GDP growth rate of the lender's country of origin or benchmarked with weighted nominal GDP growth rate in major donor countries. The weight of the member countries' currencies in SDR can be used as weights for calculating the weighted average nominal income growth. This is an example and various kinds of international transactions can be benchmarked in this manner 12 .
Similarly, financing in development projects from World Bank and International Development Association (IDA) can also be benchmarked with weighted Nominal GDP growth rate in major donor countries. This will be an alternative for interest based financing. For soft loans the nominal GDP growth rate in the recipient country can be linked (like at the rate of one-fourth of nominal GDP growth rate).
Monetary Management in Islamic Financial Environment
Central banks in countries with Islamic financial environment should follow nominal income targeting as policy regime by characterizing monetary policy as nominal income growth reaction function. Nominal income growth is to respond with differing intensity to deviation of inflation from target inflation and to deviation of real output from zero. We proposed above (expected) annual NGDPGR to be used as benchmark for Islamic finance products of assets side and NGDPGR less cost of deposit mobilisation to be used as benchmark for products on liabilities side. In between these two rates have to be the rate (like 90% of expected nominal income growth rate) at which banks should be able to place their surplus funds and one such area is financing the government deficits. When it comes to financing government deficit this should only be for public sector development projects approved by a (government) Shariah Body, like Islamic Ideology council in Pakistan, that these projects will be used for permitted (by Islam) economic activities (ensuring no other conventional financing is mixed in such projects). In case government is not in need of funds and IFIs has surplus funds to place, central bank should suck such funds (at the rate at which government should have taken the funds in case of her needs). At the time of needs of liquidity IFIs should be able to utilize central bank's windows to borrow money at expected nominal income growth rate for short term. In case government is in need of financing Shariah approved projects, and there is no surplus funds with IFIs, central bank should decide to fully/partially finance (at the rate at which IFIs should have financed in case they had surplus funds) the project(s) depending upon overall monetary (policy) management in the country in the light of nominal income growth reaction function.
Conclusion & Recommendations
There has been a rapid growth in the Islamic financial transactions, particularly, during the recent past. Parallel to this growth some efforts have been made to devise a mechanism for managing liquidity in Islamic financial market. But little attention has been paid to the issue of establishing a benchmark for pricing Islamic financial instruments. This non-existence of a distinct and standardized benchmark has created obstacles in the creation and growth of more preferable Islamic alternatives. Central banks in countries where Islamic finance is growing are using interest rate as major policy instrument. So the need is, not only to think of an acceptable (to Shariah scholars and practicable in the presence of competition from conventional financial instruments in the market) benchmark for pricing the Islamic financial instruments but also to look into policy regime under which central banks are operating. Combining two ideas, one from conventional economics and other from Islamic economics literature this study contributes in proposing a benchmark for Islamic finance industry usable for pricing Islamic finance products and in pricing instruments for public finance, the trading in which will create a source of public finance by replacing conventional OMO through providing a base instrument in OMO in Islamic monetary framework. Based on a simple visual and statistical exercise we suggest that nominal income growth rate can be used as benchmark for pricing Islamic financial instrument. For conventional economist it is an indicator which moves almost together with the conventional official policy rate. For Shariah scholars in Islamic finance it is based upon actual economic activity. Based upon similar observation for a large number of countries it is proposed that the nominal GDP growth rate can also be used as benchmark for the price of loans to/from the rest of the world including bilateral/multilateral and institutional arrangements. Pricing the international financial transactions in this manner can solve problems faced by countries in external debt management under Islamic finance principals. The paper also suggests central banks to use nominal income targeting and provides a liquidity management mechanism for banking system in Islamic financial environment.
